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The purpose of the study is to explore the shadow economy of violent extremism through charity lenses and
factors associated with misuse of charitable giving in a global ﬁnancial system. It reviews the emergency response
situations like COVID-19 when ﬁnancial needs are urgent with lacked monitoring and control over payment
disbursement to vulnerable groups. It highlights several governments’ signiﬁcant steps to counter the illicit
ﬁnance ﬂow through ‘public-face’ charity organizations. Descriptive research was used to gather secondary data
insights using published reports, articles, news portals, and policy briefs from renowned institutions. The ﬁndings
depict four factors known as economic and capacity, socio-cultural, politico-legal, and global networks support in
misuse of charitable giving to ﬁnance violent extremism. This study claims not all charitable giving misused for
extremism and violence. However, there is a possibility that extremist groups could take advantage of using
humanitarian organizations’ face to ﬁnance violent extremism. Two possible recommendations have been made
to overcome this issue by adopting digital payment mechanisms and community engagement to design and
deliver the COVID-19 response recovery programs.

1. Introduction
“Charitable giving is a big business” (Tait, 2015). It is the act of giving
money, goods, or time to the unfortunate either directly or using a
charitable trust or other worthy causes (Marquis & Tilcsik, 2016). It has
been noticed that charitable giving has become a signiﬁcantly important
subject of discussion and concern. As seen in history, the collection of
quick response funds for disaster response at the county or global level is
managed by fundraisers. But the effective monitoring aspect is a missing
part to track utilization of those funds, explicitly measuring the impact.
Since COVID-19 (Coronavirus) is hovering worldwide, extremist groups
across the ideological spectrum are taking it as an opportunity to shadow
their extremist operations and ﬁnancial ﬂows (Basit, 2020). Several
governments and global ﬁnancial institutions like World Bank Group
have released signiﬁcant funds to the fragile communities affected by the
Covid-19 pandemic.
Since the ﬁnancial form of charity is comparatively more desirable, it
has been abused by individuals and organizations who seek funds to
support violent extremist activities. Though violent extremist activities
can be supported with limited ﬁnance (Mai, 2016), these funds’ ﬂow

requires maximum secrecy with the high demand for non-traceable
channels like cash payments, which remain anonymous and fall outside
the scope of tracking banking or digital systems (Ecorys, 2017). There is a
strong connection between extremism and terrorism ﬁnancing and the
direct involvement of cash (Schneider, 2017). Levey (2005) stated that
charity organizations’ ability to receive unwetted money makes more
money available to terrorists as a one-directional ﬂow of funds leaves
little suspicion. If charity organizations prioritize relief operations in
fragile and conﬂict areas, it can provide excellent cover to the extremist
and terrorists under their supplies. Extremist groups have heavily misused charity organizations as front organizations by naming their program areas around humanitarian and relief services. COVID-19 has
ampliﬁed the intersectionality of misusing the pandemic to wage violent
extremism (Concannon, 2020). It allows extremist groups to raise funds
as cash packages and goods, which can generate cash. The Shadow
Economy of charities is there only to shadow latent goals or activities
(Constable, 2017). Recently there is much discussion regarding the funds
of such organizations or groups that promote radical and extremist narratives in different contexts (Keatinge, 2017).
There is limited literature discussing the misuse of charitable giving
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illicit ﬁnance ﬂow (Cortright, 2008). Cortright mentioned nine Special
Recommendations of FATF, the eighth of which narrates “ensure that
nonproﬁt organizations cannot be misused to ﬁnance terrorism.” But the
pandemics like COVID-19 creates the need for charitable organizations
for the humanitarian response, which offer opportunities for extremist
groups to shadow their illicit ﬁnance ﬂow. For the ﬂow of extremist
ﬁnance, charitable organizations have been used to cover humanity’s
service. Since the Covid-19 pandemic’s recovery involves huge ﬁnancial
transactions through various channels, it has signiﬁcant risks of illicit
ﬁnancial ﬂow for violent extremism under charitable giving.

to ﬁnance violent extremism. The limited academic literature offers
intense debate over terrorism ﬁnancing, and it also lapses in deﬁning
factors that support and impede in promoting violent extremism ﬁnance.
This paper explores and understands the shadow economy of violent
extremism through charity lenses by identifying its key resources, often
religion-oriented, in a global ﬁnancial ﬂow. It emphasizes emergency
response situations like COVID-19 when ﬁnancial needs are urgent with
lacked monitoring. It also intends to highlight the different governments’
signiﬁcant steps to counter the illicit ﬂow of ﬁnance through ‘public-face’
charity organizations. Recommendations are made for governments and
ﬁnancial institutions to restore charity’s utilization and its concept in the
best interest of humanity, particularly in pandemics like COVID-19. This
paper does not claim that all charities operate only to pursue extremism
or violence goals. It focuses on the research question that supports understanding the misuse of the charity concept by violent and extremist
actors. The paper structure comprises of three sections: ﬁrst, types of
charity and global ﬁnancial system; second, factors of extremism ﬁnance
and COVID-19 pandemic; the third, role of governments to counter the
misuse of charitable giving to ﬁnance violent extremism. The last section
presents a succinct conclusion.

1.2. Charities comparative assessment
Since charity is to help humanity in need, it has been politicized to
inﬂuence people in ‘other’ communities or societies to spread certain
religious, economic, or political ideologies that undermine charity’s
spirit. This trend allows certain factors to drive humanity-oriented concepts of charity as their interest-oriented such as violent extremism and
radicalization against certain factors or actors in a certain society or state.
Kant (1995) stated that peace is possible when independent states will
not be dominated by other states, either by donations in certain communities with hidden goals. The comparative assessment of charities
from the perspective of Muslims and non-Muslim speciﬁes below.

1.1. Practices of charitable giving in the ﬁnancial system
During the COVID-19 pandemic, various practices have been identiﬁed by several countries to disburse cash assistance to families. “Give the
poor cash so they can afford to stay home to slow down the pandemic”
(UNDP, 2020). UN estimates for $199 billion per month to give those
living under the poverty line in 132 developing countries. The United
States has provided a monthly allowance to people who lost their jobs
due to a pandemic in their bank account by the federal government
(Clifford, 2020), in addition to a stimulus check for all Americans.
Pakistan initiated a relief package of PKR 144 billion to low-income
families by giving PKR 12,000/- for four months using biometrically
enabled branchless banking operations for payment disbursement
(Ehsaas Emergency Cash, 2020). In India, cash transfer programs
launched of amount INR 500 in the account of women already enrolled in
ﬁnancial inclusion programs. In Kenya, 2,000 Shillings cash received per
month by over a million people. Several other countries introduced social
protection programs in response to Covid-19 by using cash transfers, such
as Cuba, Fiji, Guernsey, Slovakia, Zambia, Malta, Curacao, and the
Caribbean Netherlands. (Amundsen, 2020). Pandemics provide various
avenues for extremists to exploit the uncertainties. They are reaping
COVID-19 to generate emotional and monetary support for their violent
narratives. From February 2020, various extremist outﬁts have launched
public fundraising campaigns for COVID-19 recovery projects and ultimately inﬂuence public narratives (Burchill, 2020). In the past, humanitarian programs’ cash payments to help vulnerable groups were largely
non-trackable, making cash payments attractive for illicit transactions.
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) views that “detecting money trail
helps investigators identify terrorists and prevent terrorist attacks.’’
FATF has recognized the misuse of charity organizations to ﬂow
extremism ﬁnance, a crucial loophole in the global struggle to stop
ﬁnancing for violent extremism (Jacobson, 2009). Around 1400 bank
accounts worldwide were identiﬁed to be operated by the extremist
groups in which more than USD 140 million were frozen. It urged
extremist groups to increasingly adept least or non-traceable methods of
managing their ﬁnancial operations. Cash-based economies are favorite
for extremists to generate and ﬂow extremism ﬁnance with the least fear
of traceability. For example, the al-Qaeda in Iraq brought cash via couriers, and the London attacks in 2005 were ﬁnanced through only cash
(Kaplan, 2006). “In a cash-based economy, it is challenging to track
money as people carry huge sums of money in cash and do whatever
business they like without being tracked,’’ said Nigeria’s Secretary to
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Vanguard, 2012).
Global policies to curb extremism ﬁnance have affected nonproﬁt
organizations’ operations as donors feel threatened of being trapped into

1.3. Global south
Believing as a disaster from quicker whenever a situation like the
COVID-19 pandemic appears. They organize various types of informal
fundraising activities naming for those affected by pandemics or disasters. The key driving force for such fundraisers in Muslim majority
countries is the principle of Zakat in Islam that requires 2.5% of a person’s annual excess wealth to give those in need. Muslims must donate a
certain portion of one’s wealth for charitable purposes as Zakat. Zakat
has signiﬁcant potential to raise money for Muslim charities mainly
based in the Middle Eastern countries (Kaplan, 2006). The concept of
zakat has been widely misused to raise ﬁnance for violent extremism
activities under the umbrella of charity for disaster or pandemic
response. COVID-19 pandemic has been a lead deriver of charitable
giving in Pakistan, a country that contributes more than one percent of its
GDP to charity counting more than 2 billion USD annually (Amjad & Ali,
2018). Hundreds of charity organizations are responding the pandemic
with food and cash packages in Pakistan which has extended the fundraising grounds for extremist and banned outﬁts in the country (Imtiaz,
2020). Further, Islamic Relief is wholly and partially banned in Israel
(2014), UAE (2014), and Bangladesh (2017). Donations from charities
and wealthy individuals have remained the largest ﬁnancing source for
the groups with violent narratives.
In the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Iran were and are often
named to base such charities and individuals who remained a ﬁnancial
source of multiple organizations with violent narratives operating in
different countries. According to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
Task Force Report (2002), individuals and charities in Saudi Arabia were
critical ﬁnancial sources for al-Qaeda. However, the government of Saudi
Arabia acted in 2003 to disrupt such networks in their country. In efforts
to promote Wahhabism, an ultraconservative brand of Islam, Saudi
Arabia continue ﬁnancing networks of imams and mosques in countries
like Pakistan, Kosovo, Indonesia, and even in Europe through a range of
religious charities (Wintour, 2017). Hence Saudi Arabia’s ﬁnancing for
extremism was shadowed in most sacred institutions for Muslims, mosques, or madrasa, whose operations were never questioned at any level.
This strategy of extremist ﬁnance remained signiﬁcantly successful.
On the other hand, Qatar has been accused of being the ﬁnancial
support for the Taliban in Afghanistan and Al-Nusra in Syria through
individual philanthropists and charities, including the government itself.
Iran is considered worse as its government supports organizations to
promote Shi’ism in other countries. This mindset of pouring huge ﬁnance
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facilitators and its domain was purchased on 26th February 2020. Though
it is an interesting case linked to COVID-19, it has urged the U.S.
Department of Justice to disrupt three different terrorist ﬁnancing
schemes; cryptocurrency, online fundraising, and the use of bitcoins.
(Daymon, 2020).
Webb (2018) explained how the charitable sector has been exploited
by the Islamic extremists since the early days of jihadism in the 1980s
(Crenshaw, 2017) and claimed that the UK registered charities and
nonproﬁt organizations have been funding extremism in different
countries. UK’s Commission for Countering Extremism (2020) has
identiﬁed monetary support activities by Islamists claiming COVID-19 as
divine punishment for Western countries. ISIS celebrated the impact of
COVID-19 on Western economies, which will divert countries’ military
resources to deal with this pandemic rather than ﬁghting against ISIS
operations. In the UK, Hizb-ut-Tahrir has framed the COVID-19 pandemic
to negate democracy and the Caliphate’s establishment. In the Global
West, the charity organizations led by Muslims accused of ﬁnancing
extremism include Islamic Relief (islamic-relief.org), KinderUSA (kind
erusa.org), and Human Appeal (humanappeal.org.uk) (Westrop, 2018).
Financial Post of Canada and the UK Charities Aid Foundation have
removed Islamic Relief from the online charities page, and the HSBC
bank in the UK also closed its accounts in 2015 (Quiggin, 2018).

to promote the ideology of Wahhabism or Shi’ism has created the junction of conﬂict and violence mainly in the Muslim world as countries
supporting any of these ideologies give them space for violent expansions
(Wilson, 2017). COVID-19 has strained the Yemen government’s economic capacity and there are signiﬁcant risks of humanitarian assistance
being misused by those involved in the country’s civil war (Warrick,
2020). In India, known as the world’s largest democracy (Jaishankar,
2018), extremism has been on the rise, particularly during regimes of the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which promotes Hindu nationalism by
supporting extremist individuals and entities like Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Their support includes political patronage to carry out
violence against Christians and Muslims. They believe that India belongs
to only Hindus, and it should be puriﬁed from non-Hindus. Such organizations not only receive ﬁnancial support from like-minded high proﬁles, but public fundraising campaigns are also the primary source of
their ﬁnancial dependence (Marshall, 2004). Indian identity and Hindu
nationalism have also been essential motivations for charity among Indian immigrants in the United States (Anand, 2004). Pawan Badhe, First
Secretary, Permanent Mission of India to the UN said, “Amidst COVID-19
pandemic, extremist groups are making malevolent attempts to exploit
the ﬁnancial and emotional distress caused by lockdown” (Ani, 2020).
Far right groups exploit the COVID-19 pandemic to capitalize on their
monetary and non-monetary support (Carlo, 2020).

2. Methodology
Descriptive research was used to gather secondary sources about the
misuse of charitable giving to ﬁnance violent extremism. It reviews
policy reports from governments and international organizations by
analyzing prior research studies and blogs articles related to extremism
ﬁnance. The inclusion criteria to search for secondary data included nonpolitical and non-religious content with a civil society perspective. This
paper’s data included content analysis of secondary resources like books,
journals, and conference proceedings to develop a comprehensive understanding of the study topic. The Web of Science database was used for
systematic review from 1970 to 2020 with four indexes, i.e., Social Sciences Citation Index, Science Citation Index Expanded, Arts and Humanities Citation Index, and Emerging Sources Citation Index. Since
there is little academic work, only two studies found from the Web of
Science database, May (2020) and Bhui et al. (2016), related to the
misuse of charitable giving for extremism ﬁnance. This study excluded
the governments’ reports with partiality aspect in order to overcome the
bias in content analysis. Further, a comparative analysis was performed
to relate the Muslim and non-Muslim charities concerning extremism
ﬁnance. The systematic content analysis was conducted around two
signiﬁcant themes as charity ﬂow in religious covers to ﬁnance
extremism and terrorism, and ﬁnancial system loopholes allowing illicit
ﬁnancial ﬂow in the cover of charity. A framework supported by literature synthesis was applied in focus to third world countries to identify
various factors allowing the misuse of charity for violent extremism.

1.4. Global West
Extremism is not limited to any speciﬁc religion; extremists misuse
faith-based emotions to perpetuate their society grounds. Other than
Islam, it has been practiced among Christians, too, with various similar
approaches. For example, the Christian Institute in the UK believes
extremism only belongs to Muslims by denying extremism deﬁnition on
non-Muslims. UK’s Commission for Countering Extremism (2020) fear
that extremists are capitalizing on the socioeconomic impacts of the
COVID-19 pandemic. British Far Right activists and Neo-Nazi groups are
promoting violence against Jews and Muslims. Major Wong of the U.S.
Army has outlined that “Christian extremism as a domestic terror threat”
in the United States employs methods consistent with al-Qaeda and
Hezbollah such as death threats. He claims that violent extremism is not
limited to believers of the Islamic faith but a psychological phenomenon
with no religious base. Donations, asset sales, new credit lines, injury
lawsuits, and income tax returns were recorded as legal tactics to raise
funds for violent extremism in the U.S. In contrast, the illegal tactics were
ﬁnancial aid fraud, illegal sale of a ﬁrearm, armed robbery, drug trafﬁcking, bank fraud, embezzlement (Vidino et al., 2020). Amidst
COVID-19, “cybercriminals most likely will deply ransomware for
ﬁnancial gains” (Homeland Security, 2020). The U.S. law enforcement
authorities has seized a website, FaceMaskCenter.com (Fig. 1), claimed
to sell N95 masks, gloves, and protective gears. This website, along with
four Facebook accounts promoting it, were linked to Islamic State (IS)

Fig. 1. FaceMask.com website, and seize notice by the U.S. law enforcement.
Source: Daymon (2020).
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push people to believe more in violent narratives with increased distrust
on governments. (Bashar & Yaoren, 2020). Fragile economies cannot
spend much money to build or upgrade their ﬁnancial systems. Since
charity operations share the economic burden of fragile economies to
serve the marginalized communities, such organizations control the
public narratives in beneﬁciary communities. However, there are a few
exceptions where countries with stronger economies also fail to curb
charity ﬂows to terrorists (Ehrenfeld, 2011).
Policymakers have suggested a borderless ﬁnancial intelligence
sharing to deal with borderless terror ﬁnancing (Howell, 2007, pp. 1–46).
Law enforcement agencies need sufﬁcient ﬁnancial intelligence to detect
funds ﬂow proactively for ﬁnancing terrorism (Gilmour et al., 2017).
National governments and international organizations still do not know
much about innovative strategies used by terrorist groups to ﬂow their
ﬁnance (Keatinge & Danner, 2018). Global cooperation and coordination
among countries can help monitor transnational terrorism, especially in
pandemics like COVID-19 (Sandler, 2016). Thus, intelligence agencies
should be trained to detect propensity during pandemics to involve in
extremist activities at the individual, group, and community level (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009).

Later, a summary is presented on the key governments’ various steps to
counter misuse of charity for violent extremism and terrorism.
3. Analysis and discussion
A systematic review of the literature identiﬁed four factors behind
extremism ﬁnance in the charity lens: economic and capacity, sociocultural, political and legal, and global networks (Fig. 2).

3.1. Economic and capacity
Poverty, inequality, and unemployment signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
vulnerable people’s actions to be trapped in extremist activities (Gold,
2004). After 9/11, poverty’s argument as the sole reason to become
terrorists lost acceptance because people involved in these attacks were
far from poverty (Smith, 2002). Such facts set new realities that poverty
can have an indirect facilitating role but not always directly associated
with terrorism. Wealthy and middle-class individuals involved in
terrorist activities can be understood through Gramsci’s idea of how the
ruling elite strives to maintain a political hegemony (Swenson, 2009).
Undoubtedly, poor living conditions lead to dejection from political
systems that justify extremist activities (Ehrlich & Liu, 2002). Poverty
creates a social environment breeding insecurity and alienation, which
helps extremists recruit people from such an environment (O’Neill, 2002,
pp. 5–17). Poverty-ridden countries urge emergency projects to respond
to emergencies like COVID-19 to support those in need, creating space for
extremist groups to cover their ﬁnance in charity operations.
Fragile economies have weak ﬁnancial institutions, cash-based
economies, a lack of charity ﬂow protocols, and traditional ﬁnancial
operations mechanisms. Fighting terrorism requires many resources,
implying a direct economic cost on countries (Gold, 2004). COVID-19 has
multiplied economic burden on governments creating opportunities for
extremist networks to expand their emotional and monetary support.
Economic deprivations and social isolations caused by COVID-19 will

3.2. Political and legal
Historically, it is evident that extremist groups have exploited the
pandemics to capitalize on political and legal spaces. COVID-19
pandemic has higher risks of such exploitation as people conﬁned in
their homes are spending more time online where extremist groups’
reach is more comfortable (Wither, 2020). Considering the global political spectrum, inﬂuential governments like Qatar and Saudi Arabia
receive less political pressure to curb violent extremism than underdeveloped and third world countries like Pakistan, Somalia, and South
Sudan. Underdeveloped nations have inadequate infrastructure and lack
of resources, which provide ﬂourish opportunities to extremist groups.
Thus, several underdeveloped countries cannot disrupt and control terror

Fig. 2. Factors of ﬁnancing violent extremism through charity amidst COVID-19.
Source: Compiled from (Ehrenfeld, 2011; Force, 2015; Gilmour et al., 2017; Gold, 2004; Groves, 2016; Keatinge & Danner, 2018; Knapton, 2014; Levi et al., 2018;
Nawaz, 2016; Sandler, 2016; Smith, 2002; Swenson, 2009; Tsingou, 2020; Wright-Neville & Halafoff, 2010).
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ﬁnancing by coping with innovative ways by terrorist groups to funnel
ﬁnance to fuel their operations (Keatinge & Danner, 2018). Governments
divert their focus and resources to deal with pandemics like COVID-19. It
creates an opportunity for extremist groups to utilize the fragile political
and legal spaces to ﬂow their illicit ﬁnances. Strengthening ﬁnancial
systems for situations like COVID-19 pandemics and people’s sensitization on not donating to potentially extremist groups’ charity operations
can help prevent the spread of violent extremism.

Despite strict anti-money laundering laws, several loopholes are helping
ﬂow of money from developed to underdeveloped countries (Levi et al.,
2018), and vice versa.

3.3. Socio-cultural

Amidst COVID-19 pandemic, there have been efforts and initiatives
by different governments to counter extremist narratives and operations
at national and transnational levels. But redirection of governments’
resources to respond the pandemic has created a space for extremist
groups to inﬂuence narratives and raise their monetary support (CTED,
2020). COVID-19 urges for a strengthened partnership between the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the United States to monitor extremism
ﬁnance during this pandemic. Under this partnership, the four organizations, The Muslim Council of Elders, Hedayah, Sawab, and Forum for
Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies, need to incorporate COVID-19
scenarios in their protocols to monitor charity ﬂow for emergency
response projects. This partnership has added responsibility during the
COVID-19 pandemic to stop the ﬂow of illicit funds in the Middle East, a
region accused of being the base of generating ﬁnance for violent
extremism through charity organizations and wealthy individuals
(UAE/USA United, 2019).
Saudi Arabia partnered with the U.S. to establish a Terrorist
Financing Targeting Center in 201counter-terrorists and extremist
ﬁnancing in the Gulf region (Keatinge, 2017). The shift in Saudi Arabia’s
policy results from their support for extremism, turning back on them and
their allies in Western countries (Khalilzad, 2016). The U.S.-Gulf counterterrorism partnership has noticed the challenge of the COVID-19
pandemic being reaped by extremist groups to inﬂuence public narratives and divert their monetary support channels (Pelayo, 2020). The U.S.
has further restricted the charities from providing money to any organization or group that can potentially be misused for extremism ﬁnance,
explained by Wolosky, a former ofﬁcial of the U.S. National Security
Council (Kaplan, 2006). French authorities recently have arrested 29
people around the country who were utilizing the COVID-19 pandemic
by plotting a cryptocurrency scheme to ﬁnance jihadis (The Associated
Press, 2020). Pakistan’s NACTA (National Counter Terrorism Authority),
established in 2013, needs proactiveness amidst the COVID-19
pandemic. It needs expanded ﬁnancial intelligence of extremist groups
in the country and COVID-19 response projects by charity organizations
already on the extremism watchlist (Jorgic & Shahzad, 2019). Pakistan
Center for Philanthropy can accelerate public awareness of charity organizations with extremist narratives (PCP, 2019).
The risk factors are high during the Covid-19 pandemic for misuse of
charitable giving to ﬁnance violent extremism in developed and underdeveloped countries. Smarter investments for economic recovery will
prevent the risks of extremism ﬁnance during the COVID-19 pandemic
(Koser & O’Connell, 2020). The COVID-19 recovery response must adapt
digital payment mechanisms, algorithms for transaction tracking, cash
inﬂow, and charitable giving outﬂow monitoring.

4. A futuristic actions to charitable giving misuse amidst COVID19 pandemic
4.1. At government level

COVID-19 has signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the sociocultural dynamics of
countries around the world. The inability of critical social analysis traps
people from being beneﬁciaries of terror ﬁnancing. People in third-world
countries live at the margins of being radicalized due to their limited
worldviews. Their inability to differentiate between charities’ volunteer
work for the public good and potential extremist motives if they have
(Force, 2015).
Socio-psychological factors determine acceptable levels of humanitarian assistance by extremist ideology charity organizations. Psychology, sociology, and other behavioral sciences help understand
psychological and sociocultural factors pushing individuals to perpetuate
and support extremist activities. Contemporary psychological theories
suggest three signiﬁcant factors behind terrorist involvement: injustice,
identity, and belonging (Post, 1984). All terrorists do not have mental
illness and psychopathological problems (Borum, 2007). Speciﬁc to
COVID-19, the social isolation and more time spent online have projected
the people’s vulnerability of people being trapped into the extremists’
networks of human and ﬁnancial resource (Aryaeinejad & McGann,
2020). Individuals and groups facilitating terror ﬁnancing is a different
phenomenon where people do not directly get involved. Social exclusion
is another factor causing identity crisis, leading to extremist activities’
involvement and ﬂourishes extremist thinking (Knapton, 2014;
Wright-Neville & Halafoff, 2010). To inﬂuence the psycho-social spheres,
extremists utilize blind spots in the communal spaces to root their existences, radicalize their targets, and inﬂuence perspectives with extremist
narratives. For this purpose, extremist groups analyze the social psychology to offer monetary support covered in emergency response to the
pandemics like COVID-19.
3.4. Global networks
Countries’ political systems capacitate the money ﬂow to extremist
activities. For instance, Saudi Arabia has been found the source of money
for several global extremist activities through individual philanthropists
and charity organizations (Ehrenfeld, 2011). Pakistan is an example
where lack of political consensus is a barrier for appropriate legislation
against terror ﬁnancing. The political elite often ignores extremist
ﬁnancing to gain political beneﬁts from extreme right-vote banks such as
Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation (FIF) in Pakistan. Political exclusion can
also cause political extremism, which may foster terrorist ideology
(Rajaee, 2002, pp. 35–39). Actions to curb the ﬁnancial sources and
fundraising of banned organizations are discouraged by politicians for
their vested interests (Nawaz, 2016). “The massive amount of money that
will be spent to address the economic, social and healthcare consequences of the virus risks being at the expense of security. We must
prevent the one crisis ending up producing another”, Counter-Terrorism
Coordinator of EU has warned amidst COVID-19.
Since governments are in a dilemma of economic recovery from
COVID-19, their focus and resources will be diverted from monitoring,
preventing, and countering violent extremism. (Burchill, 2020). Since
curbing extremism ﬁnance is a highly institutionalized global governance
task, many transnational factors halt policies in this regard. Terrorist
ﬁnancing and money laundering can be controlled through global
cooperation (Tsingou, 2020). Strengthening global cooperation can
decrease ﬁnancial ﬂows to terrorist activities (Haigner et al., 2012).

4.2. At community level
Like the COVID-19 pandemic, natural disasters create space for
extremist and terrorist groups to inﬂuence public narratives through
their humanitarian response projects. Framed COVID-19 as divine punishment for ‘inﬁdels’, Al-Qaida utilizes the pandemic for public relations
campaign in Afghanistan by inviting international humanitarian organizations to resume work in Taliban-controlled areas. Taliban also
distributed pamphlets for awareness of social distancing against COVID19 to strengthen their position in political spheres. In view of communitylevel challenges, community engagement in the design and delivery of
COVID-19 recovery response programs can minimize the risks of charity
5
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money ﬂowing into extremism. It will support governance and public
accountability mechanisms for fairer disbursement of COVID-19 recovery projects for vulnerable populations. Since the COVID-19 pandemic
provides opportunities to extremist groups for disinformation to inﬂuence public narratives and raise funds, governments should engage
communities to monitor the economic recovery programs (Della-Giacoma, 2020). Even in the post-COVID-19 world, more localized response
approaches will be needed for economic recovery, restricting extremist
groups’ penetrations (Basit, 2020). To secure people from preying into
violent narratives amidst COVID-19, preventing violent extremism (PVE)
projects by humanitarian organizations must engage communities to
make feel them protective and owned. It will retain the communities’
trust upon local governments and their approved organizations in the
pandemic of social isolation. (Rosand et al., 2020).

Ani. (2020, September 26). Terrorists exploiting ﬁnancial, emotional distress.
BigNewsNetwork.com https://www.bignewsnetwork.com/news/266506958/te
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